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Abstract 
In recent years, a growing empirical literature has studied the 
consequences of offshoring for the labor market outcomes of individual 
employees in the developed countries. This paper contributes to that 
literature by analyzing the effects of offshoring on the reemployment 
wages of displaced workers in the U.S.. Results show that offshoring 
significantly lowers postdisplacement wages. The effects are 
economically important and widespread across individuals of different 
race, gender, occupation and educational level. The empirical results are 
mostly driven by workers who change industry upon reemployment, 
suggesting that the earning loss reflects a substantial devaluation of 
human capital.  
 
JEL codes: F1.  
Keywords: Offshoring; Job Displacement; Reemployment Wages; Individual-Level 
Data. 
                                                 
* I thank Paolo Epifani, Anna Falzoni and seminar participants at IAE, KITeS, and University of Milan 
for useful comments and discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
§ Address: Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain. Phone: 
+34 93 580 6612. Fax: +34 93 580 1452. E-mail: rosario.crino@iae.csic.es 
 2
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, the implications of offshoring for the developed countries' labor 
markets have gained central stage in media coverage and political debates, and have 
become the object of a large empirical literature.1 After an initial interest in the 
consequences for aggregate employment, attention has recently shifted to the economic 
costs potentially borne by individual employees, in terms of wage losses, higher job 
instability and greater risk of job displacement. Very little is still known, however, 
about whether, and how, offshoring affects individual labor market outcomes after 
displacement. This paper aims to provide new evidence on this issue, by studying the 
effects of offshoring on the reemployment wages of displaced workers in the U.S.. 
The analysis builds on individual-level data from the Displaced Workers 
Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Surveys for the period 1994-2002. The 
DWS are biannual surveys containing pre- and postdisplacement information on 
workers who lost their jobs in the three years before the interview, and constitute the 
only large and nationally representative sample of displaced workers in the U.S.. 
Exploiting information on the predisplacement industry and on the year of displacement 
of each individual, I match the DWS with industry-level proxies for offshoring, 
measured by the share of imported intermediate inputs in total non-energy input 
purchases (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999). Then, using the empirical framework 
developed by Kandilov (2006), I run Mincerian regressions of individual reemployment 
                                                 
1 Following Helpman (2006), offshoring refers to the foreign relocation of production stages, through 
both arm's length contracts and foreign direct investments. Summaries of the media and political debate 
on offshoring can be found in Baldwin (2006), Mankiw and Swagel (2006), and The Economist (2007). 
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wages on offshoring, plus a large set of controls for individual, job and industry 
characteristics. 
To preview the results, I find that rising offshoring in the predisplacement 
industry significantly lowers the reemployment wages of displaced workers. In terms of 
economic magnitude, my preferred specifications show that a 1 percentage point 
increase in offshoring reduces postdisplacement wages by about 0.29-0.58 percent. 
These estimates imply that the rise in offshoring over the sample period induced a loss 
of 110-330 dollars in the yearly reemployment wages of U.S. displaced workers. The 
effects are widespread across individuals of different race, gender, occupation and 
educational level, but are mostly borne by workers who exited the manufacturing sector 
or switched to a different manufacturing industry upon reemployment. 
These findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of existing theoretical 
models on offshoring. On the one hand, higher offshoring lowers labor demand in the 
predisplacement industry, because firms substitute domestic workers with intermediate 
inputs imported from abroad: ceteris paribus, this worsens employment opportunities 
and reduces average wages in that industry (Feenstra and Hanson, 2003). On the other 
hand, offshoring raises labor productivity through specialization, and makes it possible 
to produce the same level of output with fewer, but more rewarded employees 
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009). As a result, the fraction of workers who are 
reemployed in the old industry face no appreciable change in wages. The remaining 
workers who are forced to switch industry loose instead a substantial fraction of their 
human capital and incur a large wage loss (Neal, 1995). 
The paper makes contact with, and aims to contribute to, two different streams 
of research. First, and as already mentioned, it is related to the vast empirical literature 
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studying the labor market implications of offshoring in the developed countries. 
Motivated by an unprecedented increase in trade in intermediate inputs since the mid-
1980s,2 this literature has initially analyzed the consequences of offshoring for total 
employment and for the skill composition of the workforce. In most developed 
economies, offshoring has been found to produce little effects on total employment, and 
to change the skill composition of the workforce in favor of high skilled labor.3 Being 
based on aggregate industry-level data, this literature was however unable to unveil and 
quantify the effects on individual employees. More recent contributions have therefore 
exploited individual-level data to study the consequences of offshoring for workers' 
wages (Geishecker and Gorg, 2005, 2008; Munch and Skaksen, 2009), transitions 
across industries (Egger et al., 2007), and risk of job displacement (Geishecker, 2008; 
Munch, 2008). None of these latter contributions has however analyzed the impacts of 
offshoring after displacement. Hence, this paper adds to the individual-level literature 
new empirical evidence on this issue. 
The second stream of research to which the paper is related analyzes the 
characteristics of displaced workers and assesses the consequences of job displacement. 
In particular, the paper comes close to the set of studies explaining and quantifying the 
                                                 
2 See Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels et al. (1998), Hummels et al. (2001) and Feenstra and 
Hanson (2003) for studies documenting the rise of offshoring in the developed countries. 
3 See, in particular, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999), Morrison and Siegel (2001), Falk and Koebel 
(2002), Ekholm and Hakkala (2005), Gorg and Hanley (2005), Hijzen et al. (2005), and OECD (2007). 
Recent and updated surveys of this literature can be found in Feenstra and Hanson (2003), Hijzen (2005) 
and Crinò (2009). 
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wage losses incurred by displaced workers upon reemployment.4 According to most 
contributions, the losses are substantial, tend to persist even many years after 
reemployment, and reflect the devaluation of industry- and firm-specific human capital. 
Yet, notwithstanding the large interest in the topic, only a few contributions have so far 
tried to link the losses with events occurring in the predisplacement industry. Namely, 
Carrington and Zaman (1994) found that the wage losses in the U.S. are larger for 
workers displaced from high wage and large industries. More recently, Addison et al. 
(1995), Kletzer (2000, 2001, 2002) and Kandilov (2006) used the DWS to show that the 
losses depend also on the level of import penetration in the predisplacement industry.5 I 
am however unaware of any study that has linked the wage losses to offshoring. Hence, 
the contribution of this paper to the job displacement literature is to provide new 
evidence on how postdisplacement wages respond to offshoring. My empirical analysis 
is especially inspired by the work of Kandilov (2006), and proceeds along the same 
lines followed by the author. The results show that offshoring is an important 
determinant of postdiplacement earning losses, and that its effects are complementary to 
those of import penetration documented by Kandilov (2006). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) describes the 
data and provides some stylized facts. Section (3) introduces the empirical model and 
                                                 
4 See Flaim and Sehgal (1985), Hamermesh (1987), Podgursky and Swaim, (1987), Topel (1990), Farber 
et al. (1993), Jacobson et al. (1993), Farber et al. (1997), Stevens (1997), and Farber (2005). Detailed 
surveys of the literature can be found in Fallick (1996), Kletzer (1998) and Farber (2008). 
5 These studies complement with the vast and broader literature on the effects of trade and import 
penetration on total employment and individual job instability. See, in particular, Grossman (1987), Kruse 
(1988), Revenga (1992), Hungerford (1995), Goldberg et al. (1999), Kletzer (2004), and Davidson and 
Matusz (2005). 
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discusses the main estimation issues. Section (4) presents the results, and Section (5) 
briefly concludes. 
 
2. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS 
2.1 Data 
Individual-level data on displaced workers come the biannual Displaced Workers 
Supplements (DWS) to the January or February Current Population Surveys (CPS). I 
use the DWS for the period 1994-2002, because those for earlier and later years are not 
directly comparable, due to substantial differences in some relevant survey questions 
and in the industrial classification.6 I use the CEPR Uniform Extracts of the DWS 
(CEPR, 2006), which work out the original data set to homogenize the survey questions 
across years. 
To each individual older than 20 at the time of the survey, the DWS ask whether 
she lost her job in the three years before the interview, due to (1) plant closing, (2) 
insufficient work, (3) position abolished. If the answer is affirmative, the individual is 
then asked a number of questions about the lost job (e.g., industry and occupation, 
tenure, weekly wage, year of displacement, whether or not displacement was notified in 
advance), about the intervening spell of unemployment (e.g., time without a job), and if 
reemployed at the time of the interview, about the current job (e.g., industry and 
occupation, weekly wage, worked hours per week).7 Information from the DWS is 
                                                 
6 See Farber et al. (1997) and Kandilov (2006) for a discussion of comparability issues. 
7 In the DWS, industries are defined according to the 1980 Census Industrial Classification (CIC80), and 
are available at the 3-digit level. Occupations are instead defined according to the 1980 Census 
Occupational Classification (COC80). Note that after displacement workers may also temporarily leave 
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complemented by basic CPS data on individual characteristics, such as age, education, 
gender, race, marital status, and state of residence. Panel a) of Table 1 reports details on 
names and definitions for all individual-level variables used below in the empirical 
analysis. 
Following previous studies (e.g., Addison and Portugal, 1989), I restrict the 
sample to individuals displaced from a full-time manufacturing job, who aged 20 to 65 
and were still in the labor force at the time of the interview.8 As a result, the final 
sample includes 3586 individuals displaced between 1991 and 2001; of these, 2743 
were reemployed at the time of the interview. I report nominal figures for wages on both 
current and lost jobs at constant 1987 dollars using the Consumer Price Index of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Moreover, as suggested by Angrist and Krueger 
(1999), I "winsorize" the wages by replacing values in the lower and upper 1 percent 
tails with the those of the 1th and 99th percentiles. 
The DWS have become widely used in the job displacement literature because 
they contain a large and nationally representative sample of displaced workers, and this 
makes them preferable to other alternatives like the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
Yet, the DWS have a number of potential limitations, which have been widely discussed 
in previous studies. First, they only contain information on one episode of job 
displacement, i.e. that involving the loss of the longest job; in the event of more than 
one displacement, it is only possible to retrieve the number of jobs held by the 
individual before the interview, but not their characteristics: as a result, variables like 
                                                                                                                                               
the labor force. Hence, I somewhat loosely refer to the period after displacement as a spell of 
unemployment. A more precise, but less synthetic definition would be spell of non-employment. 
8 Following the convention for the U.S., full-time jobs are those requiring more than 35 hours per week. 
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the labor market experience after displacement may be measured with error (Kletzer, 
1989). Second, the DWS do not follow workers over time, and therefore do not allow to 
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (Addison and Portugal, 1989). Third, 
the DWS are based on retrospective data, which makes likely that individuals report 
only the most costly episodes of displacement, especially for those occurred long before 
the interview (Evans and Leighton, 1995). Fourth, the sample of displaced workers may 
not be random, because firms are more likely to fire the least productive employees 
(Neal, 1995). Fifth, reemployment wages are reported only for individuals employed at 
the time of the interview, who may not constitute a random sample drawn from the 
stock of the unemployed (Addison and Portugal, 1989). I devote Section (3) to discuss 
how the empirical strategy deals with these issues. 
Exploiting information on the predisplacement industry and on the year of 
displacement of each worker, I match the DWS data with industry-level proxies for 
offshoring.9 Following a well established line of empirical research initiated by Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996, 1999), I proxy offshoring with the share of imported intermediate 
inputs in total non-energy input purchases. The idea underlying this measure is that, 
because intermediate inputs produced abroad have to be imported in the U.S. to enter 
the production process with other factors, the more intense offshoring is, the higher this 
indicator will be. Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1999) have been the first to estimate 
imported intermediate inputs at the industry-level for the U.S.. Their methodology 
                                                 
9 The offshoring proxies and the other industry variables described below are defined at the 3- or 4-digit 
level of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC87). They are converted into CIC80 codes using 
the correspondence table of the BLS. Due to data availability, after matching I lose the industry "Dyeing 
and finishing textiles, except wool and knit goods", and remain with a total of 76 CIC industries for the 
econometric analysis. 
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consists in combining Input-Output Matrixes and economy-wide data on import 
penetration rates. I will strictly follow the Feenstra and Hanson's approach to construct 
my first proxy for offshoring below. 
Input-Output tables are released every five years by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and provide detailed information on the value of inputs purchased by 
each industry to produce 1 dollar worth of output. I use the six matrixes spanning the 
period 1977-2002, because those for earlier and later years are not directly comparable 
due to the change in industrial classification. Call the purchases of input k by industry j 
in each of the six years t as αjkt. Multiplying αjkt by industry output (Yjt) yields the total 
value of input k purchased by industry j.10 The fraction of the input coming from abroad 
can be estimated by multiplying this value with the economy-wide import penetration 
rate for input k, defined as imports (M) over apparent consumption, i.e. output plus 
imports minus exports (X).11 Summing over all inputs k yields the total value of 
imported inputs by industry j (IMPINTjt): 
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Following, among others, Ekholm and Hakkala (2005), the values of the missing years 
are imputed through linear interpolation. Due to the matching with the DWS, only data 
for the period 1991-2001 are used in this paper, although values for previous years will 
be exploited to form instruments for current offshoring as explained in the next section. 
                                                 
10 Data on industry output come from the NBER Productivity Database up to 1996, and from the Annual 
Survey of Manufactures for later years. 
11 Detailed data on imports and exports come from Feenstra et al. (2002). 
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 Although widely used, the indicator in (1) is subject to strong assumptions, 
which may raise concerns about its ability to capture the true size and time behavior of 
the imports of intermediate inputs. First, the indicator assumes that each industry 
imports the same share of a given input as the economy as a whole, due to the use of 
economy-wide import penetration rates in (1). Second, the indicator uses interpolation 
to retrieve the values of the missing years. In order to make sure that the results are not 
driven by measurement error, I will therefore use throughout all the analysis a 
complementary measure that relaxes both assumptions. This measure has been 
constructed by Schott (2004) using highly detailed import data at the product-level. For 
each industry, Schott (2004) estimated imported intermediate inputs by the foreign 
purchases of products whose name includes either the word "parts" or the word 
"components". I call this measure IMPINT_Sc.12 Note that this measure relaxes both the 
assumptions underlying IMPINT, because it is based on official import data available 
for the whole period of analysis. As a drawback, it includes only inputs produced within 
the industry, and not also those produced by different industries. Hence, the scope of 
IMPINT_Sc is narrower than that of IMPINT. 
 The last step to obtain the proxies for offshoring (OSjt and OS_Scjt) consists in 
normalizing IMPINT and IMPINT_Sc by the total value of non-energy inputs purchased 
by each industry (NEjt):13 
.
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12 Data are available on Peter Schott’s web site, at 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm. 
13 Sourced from the NBER Productivity Database and the Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
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Despite the wide use in the literature (see, in particular, Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 
1999), this normalization may be problematic, especially for industries that substitute 
their own production of inputs with foreign purchases: in these cases, in fact, both the 
numerators and the denominators of (2) will increase by the same amount and the 
change in offshoring will be underestimated.14 Following, among others, Hijzen et al. 
(2005), I will thus perform robustness checks using industry output as an alternative 
normalization for both indicators in (2). 
 Finally, I construct a number of other variables to be used in the econometric 
analysis as controls for other relevant characteristics of the predisplacement industry 
and of the local labor markets. Namely, exploiting data from Feenstra et al. (2002) I 
compute the ratio of imports over apparent consumption (IMPEN) to control for the 
degree of import penetration in the predisplacement industry. As in Berman et al. 
(1994), I use the share of capital stock accounted for by Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT, sourced from the BEA) to account for technical 
progress. Using the NBER Productivity Database and the Annual Survey of 
Manufactures, I construct labor productivity (value added per worker, LABPROD) to 
control for productivity shocks, real output (real value of shipments, Y) to account for 
differences in industry size, skill intensity (the employment share of non-production 
workers, SKINT) and capital intensity (the capital stock per worker, CAPINT) to control 
for differences in factor intensities. Finally, I use state-level unemployment rates 
(URATE, sourced from the BLS) to account for differences in economic conditions 
                                                 
14 See Horgos (2009) for a discussion of measurement issues involved in the construction of offshoring 
indicators. 
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across local labor markets.15 Details on names, sources and definitions for these 
variables are in panel b) of Table 1. 
 
2.2 Stylized Facts 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the industry- and state-level variables. Focusing 
on panel a), note that the offshoring proxy based on Input-Output data (OS) averages at 
9 percent over the sample period, while the proxy based on imports of parts and 
components (OS_Sc) averages at 5 percent: as expected, the scope of OS_Sc is narrower 
than that of OS. Both measures have grown between 1991 and 2001, the increase being 
larger for OS (6 percentage points) than for OS_Sc (1 percentage point): in line with 
previous evidence, therefore, offshoring has become an increasingly common 
phenomenon in the U.S. during the 1990s. Interestingly, the table also shows that the 
rise in offshoring has been accompanied by a surge in the exposure of manufacturing 
industries to import penetration: IMPEN has in fact increased by 9 percentage points 
between 1991 and 2001. 
 Table 3 contains summary statistics on displaced workers. The first three 
columns refer to the whole sample and the next three columns to the sub-sample of 
reemployed workers. Note that more than three-fourths of individuals are reemployed at 
the time of the interview. Unreported figures show that the percentage of reemployed 
                                                 
15 The DWS does not contain information on the state of residence before displacement. The state 
unemployment rates are therefore matched to the individual-level data using the information on current 
state of residence contained in the basic CPS. Note, however, that workers’ geographic mobility after 
displacement is very limited: in the sample, only 13 percent of workers changed city (but not necessarily 
state) after loosing their job. 
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individuals increases steadily with time since displacement, although the largest 
increase occurs when moving from one to two years after the job loss: 62 percent of 
workers displaced one year before the interview are reemployed at the time of the 
survey, while the fraction rises to 87 and 90 percent, respectively, for workers displaced 
two and three years before the interview. 
 Compared to the whole sample, reemployed workers are more likely to be male, 
white, married, highly educated and U.S. born, and they earn more on the lost job. They 
also change a higher number of jobs after displacement and have longer labor market 
experience (proxied, as in Kletzer (1989), by the difference between year of the survey, 
year of displacement and time spent before finding the first new job), although this 
latter result may reflect the fact that displacement occurs longer before the interview for 
the reemployed individuals than for the whole sample. Finally, reemployed workers are 
more likely to be displaced by plant closing and position abolished, and less so by 
insufficient work; they also receive advance notice of displacement more often than the 
whole sample of individuals. 
 The remaining columns of Table 3 confront reemployed workers displaced from 
high-offshoring and low-offshoring industries, respectively defined as industries above 
and below the median percentage change in offshoring between 1991 and 2001. Note 
that workers displaced from high-offshoring industries tend to have lower 
reemployment wages than those displaced from low-offshoring industries. The 
difference ranges from 9 dollars per week (468 dollars per year) in the case of OS to 43 
dollars per week (2236 dollars per year) in the case of OS_Sc.16 Note also, however, that 
workers displaced from high-offshoring industries are more likely to be female, foreign 
                                                 
16 The annual figures are estimated by considering an average of 52 weeks per year. 
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born and non-white, they earned already less on the lost job, have shorter experience 
after displacement, and work fewer hours on the new job. These factors may partly 
explain the lower reemployment wages. In the next section, I will therefore attempt to 
isolate the effects of offshoring by conditioning the analysis on individual and job 
characteristics, as well as on a large set of industry- and state-level controls. Moreover, I 
will exploit the whole time variability of offshoring in each industry, rather than just the 
change between the endpoints of the sample. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
I use the empirical approach developed by Kandilov (2006) following a large empirical 
literature on the determinants of postdisplacement wages.17 In particular, I estimate the 
following Mincerian regression by Ordinary Least Squares: 
,
ln
'
6
'
5
'
4
'
3
'
2
'
10
τττ
τττ
εβββ
ββββ
ijsttjts
itiiijst
TIMEINDUSSTATE
PASTJCURRJINDIVw
++++
++++=
 (3) 
where w is the real weekly reemployment wage of worker i, displaced from industry j in 
year t, living in state s and reemployed in period τ (where τ ≠ t, and 1≤ τ - t≤3). The 
vector INDIV contains standard controls for individual characteristics, namely age and 
age squared, dummies for gender, marital status, citizenship and metropolitan area 
residence, a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is white and a dummy equal to 1 if she 
holds at least a bachelor degree. CURRJ and PASTJ contain, respectively, variables for 
current job (the log number of worked hours per week) and variables for past job 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Addison and Portugal (1989), Kletzer (1989) and Ruhm (1990, 1991). 
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(industry and occupation dummies).18, 19 STATE contains state-level controls, namely 
the unemployment rate and a full set of state dummies, while TIME includes year-of-
displacement and year-of-survey dummies that control for macroeconomic shocks at the 
time of displacement and of the interview. Finally, INDUS contains industry-level 
variables, including offshoring and the controls presented in Section (2); ε is a white-
noise disturbance. Note that, because the specification includes dummies for the 
predisplacement industry, the coefficients of offshoring are identified only by within-
industry variation over time. 
 A first problem with equation (3) is that the combination of individual- and 
industry-level data may give rise to contemporaneous correlation in the error terms, and 
bias the standard errors (Moulton, 1990). As conventional, I will therefore adjust the 
standard errors for clustering within 3-digit industries. A second estimation issue is the 
potential endogeneity of offshoring, which arises if wages and offshoring are chosen 
simultaneously or if there are unobserved time-variant industry characteristics that 
jointly influence the two variables. As discussed by Geishecker and Gorg (2008), 
simultaneity should not be crucial when combining individual wage data with industry-
                                                 
18 I control for hours on current job to clean the results from changes in labor supply after displacement, 
and in particular from the effects of switching to part-time jobs. This is necessary because the only 
comparable wage variable reported by the DWS for both current and lost job is measured weekly, and 
may therefore reflect changes in worked hours upon reemployment. Results are qualitatively the same if 
an indicator for full-time jobs is used instead, or if the sample is restricted to workers reemployed full-
time; in this latter case, however, the loss of degrees of freedom is substantial, due to the lower number of 
observations. 
19 Predisplacement industry dummies are 75 binary indicators for the CIC80 3-digit industries, while 
occupation dummies are 11 binary indicators for the COC80 major occupational groups. 
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level offshoring proxies; this argument should be even more compelling in this case, 
because offshoring is observed with one- to three-year lags relative to the reemployment 
wages. Similarly, omitted unobserved characteristics should not play a large role, 
because equation (3) is conditioned on a large set of industry controls. Nevertheless, I 
will formally test for the exogeneity of offshoring, by reporting the C-statistics obtained 
with Instrumental Variable estimation of (3) using the first two lags of offshoring as 
instruments (as in Geishecker and Gorg, 2008). 
 Additional bias may arise from the aforementioned limitations of the DWS. The 
first issue is that the DWS do not allow for proper measurement of the labor market 
experience after displacement. This variable may be negatively correlated with 
offshoring, as workers displaced from high-offshoring industries may face more 
difficulties in finding a new job, and positively correlated with the reemployment 
wages, as the latter usually grow with postdisplacement experience (Kletzer, 1989). 
Omitting this variable from (3) may thus induce a negative bias in the offshoring 
coefficients, while including it may bias the results due to measurement error. I will 
follow Neal (1995), and report a separate set of estimates obtained by augmenting 
equation (3) with labor market experience after displacement, while controlling for the 
number of jobs held by the individual before the interview to partly account for the 
effects of additional displacement episodes. 
 The lack of longitudinal information in the DWS prevents from controlling for 
individual unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., ability). Previous studies have however 
shown that wage and tenure on the lost job convey substantial information on 
unobserved individual abilities: these variables represent in fact important predictors of 
reemployment wages, suggesting that they reflect innate characteristics that the worker 
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carries on across jobs (Addison and Portugal, 1989; Kletzer, 1989). Following these 
studies, I will therefore show separate estimates of an augmented model that also 
includes wage, tenure and tenure squared on the lost job. 
 The retrospective nature of the DWS implies that individuals are more likely to 
report costly episodes of displacement, especially if the latter occurred long before the 
interview. In these circumstances, reemployment outcomes may be worse than after less 
painful episodes. Following the usual approach in the literature (see, e.g., Kletzer, 
2000), I will perform robustness checks by keeping only individuals displaced no more 
than two years before the survey, for whom the recall bias is more limited. An 
additional problem with the DWS is that the sample of displaced workers may be 
endogenously determined by firms firing less productive employees, who then face 
worse reemployment outcomes. The conventional approach in the literature is to restrict 
the sample to individuals displaced by plant closing, whose displacement is usually 
considered as exogenous (Topel, 1990; Neal, 1995). I will follow the same approach in 
some robustness checks of the main results. 
 A last estimation issue is raised by the fact that the reemployed workers may not 
represent a random sample drawn from the stock of unemployed individuals. In 
particular, reemployed workers may have lower reservation wages, and therefore, 
ceteris paribus, their postdisplacement earnings may be lower than those of individuals 
who are still unemployed (Addison and Portugal, 1989). To account for the sample 
selection, I will report robustness checks using the Heckman's (1979) two-step 
estimator. In practice, the wage equation (3) will be augmented by the inverted Mills 
ratio from a probit reemployment equation. Identification of the model requires that 
some variables enter the probit equation, but are excluded from the wage equation. 
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Following Addison and Portugal (1989), I will exclude the year-of-displacement 
dummies, which are intrinsically associated with the selection mechanism since workers 
displaced more recently have less chances of finding a new job, as shown in Section 
(2).20 Moreover, following results in Ruhm (1992) and Fallick (1993), I will include in 
the selection equation (but not in the wage equation) dummies for reason of 
displacement and for whether displacement was notified in advance to the worker. 
Finally, hours worked on the current job will enter the wage equation but not the probit 
equation, because they are observed only for reemployed individuals. 
 
4. RESULTS 
OLS estimates of equation (3) are reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and (6) refer to the 
baseline model with no control for labor market experience and individual 
heterogeneity; in column (1) offshoring is proxied by OS, while in column (6) it is 
proxied by OS_Sc. Note that all coefficients on the individual-level variables are 
precisely estimated and have the expected sign. In particular, weekly reemployment 
wages are increasing and concave in age, and are lower for female, foreign born, non-
white, unskilled and non-married individuals, as well as for those living outside a 
metropolitan area. Moreover, weekly reemployment wages rise with the number of 
worked hours, suggesting that this control is important to isolate true wage changes 
from adjustments in labor supply. 
 The state unemployment rate enters the specifications with a large negative 
coefficient, although the parameters are imprecisely estimated. Consistent with 
                                                 
20 Note that the difference between the survey year and the displacement year measures time since 
displacement. 
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expectations and with results from previous studies (Kandilov, 2006), bad economic 
conditions in the local labor markets are therefore associated with lower reemployment 
wages. As for the industry-level controls, note that their coefficients are generally 
imprecisely estimated, probably because much of the effects of these variables is 
already absorbed by the industry- and time-dummies. The pattern of sign suggests 
however that reemployment wages are positively affected by labor productivity and 
skill intensity in the predisplacement industry, and negatively affected by industry size 
and ICT intensity. 
 Turning to offshoring, the estimated coefficients are negative and precisely 
estimated at the 5 percent level in both column (1) and column (6). Hence, higher 
offshoring in the predisplacement industry significantly lowers individual 
reemployment wages. The point estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in 
offshoring reduces postdisplacement earnings by about 0.37 percent in the case of OS 
and 0.62 percent in the case of OS_Sc. The bottom part of the table contains test 
statistics obtained from Instrumental Variable estimation of (3) using the first two lags 
of the offshoring proxies as instruments for their current levels. Note that the Hansen J-
statistics for overidentifying restrictions are low, while the F-statistics for excluded 
instruments are high: overall, this suggests that lagged values of offshoring are valid 
and relevant instruments for current levels.21 Importantly, the C-statistics do not reject 
the null hypothesis that offshoring is exogenous in equation (3). 
                                                 
21 The F-statistics are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation in the error 
terms, as suggested by Baum et al. (2003). As a rule of thumb, an F-statistic higher than 10 indicates that 
instruments are relevant (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
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 In the following columns, the baseline model is progressively augmented with 
other control variables. To start with, columns (2) and (7) include industry- and state-
specific time trends, to control for changes in economic conditions that are not fully 
captured by the variables already present in the baseline specifications. Results are 
qualitatively unaffected, and the offshoring coefficients actually increase in absolute 
terms. Columns (3) and (8) control for labor market experience after displacement and 
for the number of jobs held by the individual before the interview. Consistent with 
results in Kletzer (1989), reemployment earnings rise with experience. The positive 
effect of this variable is however mitigated by an increase in the number of jobs held 
before the interview. The coefficients of offshoring remain negative and precisely 
estimated and show only minor changes in their absolute size. This suggests that 
controlling for labor market experience does not make a large difference in practice. 
 Columns (4) and (9) include log wage, tenure and tenure squared on the lost job, 
in order to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Note that reemployment 
wages are positively affected by these variables, whose coefficients are remarkably 
close to those estimated by previous studies (see, e.g., Addison and Portugal, 1989). As 
already mentioned, one possible explanation for this finding is that wages and tenure on 
the lost job capture unobserved individual characteristics that are valued also by the new 
employers. After including these controls, the offshoring coefficients remain negative 
and significant, but drop in absolute terms: this suggests that workers displaced from 
high-offshoring industries have unobserved characteristics that negatively affect their 
reemployment wages. 
 Finally, columns (5) and (10) control for import penetration. This variable enters 
with the negative sign and its coefficient is precisely estimated: consistent with 
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Kandilov (2006), higher import penetration in the predisplacement industry lowers 
wages upon reemployment. The coefficients of IMPEN show that a one percentage 
point increase in import penetration reduces postdisplacement wages by about 0.50 
percent. The magnitude of the effect is larger than in Kandilov (2006), where the same 
increase in import penetration was found to lower reemployment wages by about 0.20 
percent. Because the sample used by the author starts in 1979, this probably suggests 
that the impact of import penetration has become stronger over time.22 More 
importantly, both offshoring proxies continue to enter with the negative sign, and their 
coefficients remain statistically significant. Hence, offshoring represents a 
complementary determinant of postdiplacement earning losses, and its effects worsen 
those of import penetration. 
 How large is the impact of offshoring on postdisplacement wages? To answer 
this question, I perform a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation of the change in real 
wages induced by the increase in offshoring over the sample period. Multiplying the 
coefficients in columns (5) and (10) of Table 4 with the percentage changes in the 
offshoring proxies reported in Table 2 yields a reduction in the real weekly 
reemployment earnings of about 1.75 percent for OS and 0.60 percent for OS_Sc. Given 
a mean reemployment wage of 361 dollars per week in 1991, these figures imply, 
respectively, a weekly loss of 6.3 and 2.1 dollars. Finally, considering an average of 52 
weeks per year, the annual loss ranges between 328 and 109 dollars. 
  
 
 
                                                 
22 Kandilov (2006) found stronger effects, of the same order of magnitude as those of IMPEN, when using 
import penetration from low-income countries instead of overall import penetration. 
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4.1 Robustness Checks 
Table 5 contains robustness checks of the previous results, using the same specifications 
as in columns (5) and (10) of Table 4. For the sake of space, the table reports only the 
coefficients of offshoring. To begin with, panel a) replaces OS and OS_Sc with 
equivalent indicators normalized by real output rather than non-energy inputs. While the 
precision of the estimates falls somewhat, coefficients remain negative and are even 
larger than in previous specifications, suggesting that the main results are not just an 
artifact of the chosen normalization. 
 In panel b), the sample is restricted to workers displaced no more than two years 
before the interview, in order to mitigate the potential recall bias in the DWS. 
Reassuringly, coefficients maintain the negative sign and are precisely estimated at the 
5 percent level. Interestingly, point estimates are larger than those obtained on the 
whole sample. This suggests that, although relevant in theory, recall bias is not a crucial 
issue for the main results of the paper. Panel c) restricts the sample to workers displaced 
after plant closing. The offshoring coefficients remain negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that the previous findings are not driven by the potential 
endogeneity of the DWS sample due to firms firing less productive employees. 
 Panel d) contains results obtained with the Heckman's (1979) two-step estimator, 
which corrects for selection bias in the sample of reemployed individuals. Estimates of 
the probit reemployment equation are reported separately in Table 6, and are broadly 
consistent with previous studies (e.g., Addison and Portugal, 1989; Kandilov, 2006): in 
particular, the probability of reemployment is higher for white, married and skilled 
individuals, increases when displacement is notified in advance, and is negatively 
affected by bad economic conditions in the local labor markets. Coming back to panel 
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d) of Table 5, note that the Mills ratio enters the wage equation with the negative sign, 
pointing to negative selection: ceteris paribus, reemployed individuals have lower 
postdisplacement wages compared to those who are still unemployed at the time of the 
interview. Nevertheless, selection is not strong enough to undermine the main results on 
offshoring. 
 
4.2 Individual Characteristics and Industrial Mobility 
I now extend the model to study whether the previous results mask heterogeneity across 
different subsets of displaced workers. I focus on four characteristics: education, 
occupation, race and gender. In practice, I augment the richest specifications in columns 
(5) and (10) of Table 4 with interaction terms between the offshoring proxies and 
dummies for high-skilled, white-collar, female and white individuals.23 Results are 
reported in Table 7. Interestingly, none of the interaction terms is statistically different 
from zero. This suggests that the effects of offshoring are independent of individual 
characteristics, of the type of occupation, and of the level of educational attainment. 
 At a first glance, the result for high-skilled and white-collar employees may 
seem surprising, given the robust finding in the previous literature that offshoring raises 
the relative earnings of more educated and white-collar workers. More recent 
contributions suggest however that this effect is mostly driven by an increase in the 
relative wages of skilled workers who remain continuously employed (Geishecker and 
                                                 
23 The white-collar dummy takes value 1 if before displacement the worker performed one of the 
following occupations: executive, administrative and managerial occupations; professional specialty 
occupations; technical and related support occupations; sales occupations; administrative support 
occupations; other service occupations. 
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Gorg, 2008), and by longer periods of unemployment for unskilled workers who loose 
their jobs due to offshoring (Geishecker, 2008). 
 Next, I study whether the effects of offshoring are related to the sectorial and 
industrial mobility of workers after displacement. In my sample, a large fraction of 
workers (53 percent) are reemployed outside the manufacturing sector, and even among 
the individuals who are reemployed in manufacturing a substantial share (60 percent) 
switch to a different 3-digit industry. Does offshoring affect these workers differently 
from those who find a new job in the old industry? To answer this question, I augment 
the richest specifications in Table 4 with interaction terms between the two offshoring 
proxies and dummies for whether the individual is reemployed outside the 
manufacturing sector or in a different manufacturing industry.  
 Results are in Table 8. Columns (1) and (3) analyze the effects of exiting the 
manufacturing sector, while columns (2) and (4) those of switching to a different 3-digit 
manufacturing industry. Strikingly, all coefficients of the interaction terms are negative, 
large, and precisely estimated at the 1 percent level. The coefficients of the linear terms, 
on the other hand, are always small and generally insignificant. These results suggest 
that the wage losses documented before crucially depend on the sectorial and industrial 
mobility of workers after displacement: individuals who exit the manufacturing sector 
or change industry upon reemployment bear the bulk of the earning loss; for the 
remaining workers, there is no sensible change in wages. 
 Can this evidence be reconciled with existing theories of offshoring? Although, 
to the best of my knowledge, there is still no model studying explicitly how offshoring 
shapes worker mobility across industries and how this feeds back into individual wages, 
some broader theories of offshoring may probably help rationalize these facts. 
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According to a first set of models, offshoring should reduce labor demand in the 
industry, because firms are allowed to substitute domestic workers with imported 
intermediate inputs: ceteris paribus, this should worsen reemployment opportunities in 
the predisplacement industry and drive down the average wage (Feenstra and Hanson, 
2003). Other models stress instead that offshoring raises labor productivity, because 
firms can exploit a more efficient allocation of production across national borders: other 
things being equal, this allows the predisplacement industry to produce the same level 
of output with less employment at higher wages (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009). 
Combining the two effects imply that only a fraction of workers will find new jobs in 
the old industry, while the others will be forced to switch to different industries. This is 
consistent with the figures on postdisplacement mobility mentioned above. Moreover, 
for the workers who stay in the old industry, there may not be any appreciable change in 
wages, due to the offsetting effects of a lower labor demand and a higher labor 
productivity. For the other workers, instead, wages may substantially decline, because 
by changing industry they loose a large fraction of human capital (Neal, 1995). The 
pattern of wage changes emerging from Table 8 is broadly consistent with these 
predictions. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper studied the effects of offshoring on the reemployment wages of U.S. 
displaced workers over the 1990s. The empirical results showed that offshoring implies 
a substantial earning loss, which ranges between 110 and 330 dollars per year and is 
independent of individual characteristics such as gender and age, occupation and 
educational level. The effects are driven by the large share of individuals who are forced 
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to change industry upon reemployment, suggesting that the earning loss reflects a 
substantial devaluation of human capital. 
 These findings point to a new, and so far rather overlooked channel through 
which offshoring may impose economic costs on individual employees. Not only can it 
raise job instability and the risk of job loss as recently suggested by a number of 
empirical studies, it can also worsen labor market outcomes after displacement. Overall, 
this brings about two implications for the redesign of government intervention programs 
aimed to assist workers against negative trade shocks. First, these programs should be 
extended to industries experiencing upsurges in offshoring, and not just limited to those 
exposed to import penetration and foreign competition. Second, they should be 
broadened so as to support individual income not only during unemployment, but also 
in the initial period after reemployment, when workers' skills usually do not match with 
those required on the new job. 
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REASON 3 Reason for Displacement Dummy : Equal to 1 if displaced
because of position abolished
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
REASON 1 Reason for Displacement Dummy : Equal to 1 if displaced by
plant closing
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
REASON 2 Reason for Displacement Dummy : Equal to 1 if displaced
because of insufficient work
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
Sources
BEA Input-Output Matrices for years 1977, 1982, 1987,
1992, 1997, 2002. NBER Manufacturing Industry
Productivity Database. Annual Survey of Manufactures.
OS_Sc Offshoring : (Imported intermediate inputs)/(total non-energy
input purchases). Proxy based on imports of parts and
components from product-level data
Schott (2004). NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity
Database. Annual Survey of Manufactures.
Offshoring : (Imported intermediate inputs)/(total non-energy
input purchases). Proxy based on Input-Output data and
economy-wide import penetration rates
OS
Label Definition
a) Individual-Level Variables
IMPEN Import Penetration : Imports/(Production+Imports-Exports) Feenstra et al. (2002). NBER Manufacturing Industry
Productivity Database. Annual Survey of Manufactures.
NOTICE Advance Notice Dummy : Equal to 1 if displacement was
notified in advance
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
b) Industry- and State-Level Variables
NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.
Annual Survey of Manufactures.
LABPROD Labor Productivity : (Value Added)/(Total Employment) NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.
Annual Survey of Manufactures.
Y Real Output : Value of shipments at constant 1987 U.S.
dollars
SKINT Skill Intensity : (Non-Production Workers)/(Total
Employment)
NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.
Annual Survey of Manufactures.
CAPINT Capital Intensity : (Capital Stock)/(Total Employment) NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database.
Annual Survey of Manufactures.
ICT High-Tech Share of Capital Stock : (High-Tech
Capital)/(Total Capital Stock)
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
URATE State-Level Unemployment Rate Bureau of Labor Statistics.
EMPL Employed Dummy : Equal to 1 if employed at the survey date Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
CURRENT JOB WAGE Real Weekly Wage on Current Job : Constant 1987 U.S.
dollars
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
CURRENT JOB HOURS Weekly Hours on Current Job Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
EXPERIENCE Years of Labor Market Experience after Displacement : 
(Year of Survey-Year of Displacement-Duration of
Unemployment)
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
# JOBS Number of Jobs Held after Displacement Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
LOST JOB WAGE Real Weekly Wage on Lost Job : Constant 1987 U.S. dollars Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
LOST JOB TENURE Years of Tenure on Lost Job Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
FEMALE Female Dummy : Equal to 1 if female Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
HIGHSKILLED High Skilled Dummy : Equal to 1 if holds at least a bachelor
degree
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
WHITE White Dummy : Equal to 1 if white Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
METRO Metropolitan Area Dummy : Equal to 1 if lives in
metropolitan areas
Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
Table 1 - Variables
AGE Age : Years Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
MARRIED Married Dummy : Equal to 1 if married Displaced Workers Supplements (1994-2002).
FORBORN Foreign Born Dummy : Equal to 1 if born outside the U.S.
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Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Change 91-01 
a) Offshoring and Import Penetration
OS 836 0.09 0.02 0.06
OS_Sc 836 0.05 0.01 0.01
IMPEN 836 0.19 0.03 0.09
b) Industry-Level Controls
Y 836 45060761 77616068 -
LABPROD 836 121 125 -
CAPINT 836 102 120 -
SKINT 836 0.29 0.13 -
ICT 836 0.05 0.03 -
c) State-Level Controls
URATE 561 0.05 0.02 -
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics on Offshoring and Control Variables
Author's calculations on a sample of 11 years and 76 industries (panels a) and b)), and 11 years and 51 states (panel c)). Reported figures are
fractions, except for the change between 1991 and 2001 (in percentage points) and for the variables Y , LABPROD , and CAPINT (in
thousands of U.S. dollars, at constant 1987 prices). Variable names, definitions and sources are reported in Table 1.
35
High OS Low OS High OS_Sc Low OS_Sc
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Mean Mean Mean
EMPL 3586 0.77 0.42 2743 1.00 - 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CURRENT JOB WAGE - - - 2743 389.03 293.52 385.55 394.65 364.55 407.12
CURRENT JOB HOURS - - - 2743 40.40 9.26 40.27 40.61 40.04 40.79
EXPERIENCE 3586 1.30 1.22 2743 1.42 1.18 1.37 1.50 1.40 1.45
# JOBS 3586 1.25 1.06 2743 1.50 0.95 1.46 1.56 1.50 1.50
LOST JOB WAGE 3586 576.78 497.08 2743 581.89 495.99 581.55 582.29 541.27 620.61
LOST JOB TENURE 3586 6.72 7.78 2743 6.70 7.65 6.53 6.96 6.05 7.01
FEMALE 3586 0.35 0.48 2743 0.34 0.47 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.31
MARRIED 3586 0.62 0.49 2743 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.65
FORBORN 3586 0.13 0.33 2743 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.11
WHITE 3586 0.77 0.42 2743 0.80 0.40 0.78 0.82 0.77 0.83
METRO 3586 0.76 0.43 2743 0.75 0.43 0.78 0.71 0.76 0.76
AGE 3586 39.66 10.75 2743 39.45 10.57 39.22 39.77 38.98 39.81
HIGHSKILLED 3586 0.19 0.39 2743 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.22
REASON 1 3586 0.42 0.49 2743 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.41
REASON 2 3586 0.36 0.48 2743 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35
REASON 3 3586 0.22 0.42 2743 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.24
NOTICE 3543 0.40 0.49 2713 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.42
Author's calculations based on DWS (1994-2002). The sample includes individuals displaced from a full-time manufacturing job between 1991 and 2001, who aged 20-
65 and were still in the labor force at the time of the interview. High-offshoring industries are those above the median change in the offshoring proxy between 1991 and
2001. Variable names, definitions and sources are reported in Table 1.
All
Whole Sample
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics on Displaced Workers
Reemployed Workers
Displaced from:
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Offshoring Proxy
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OFFSHORING -0.371** -0.386** -0.361** -0.298* -0.291* -0.623** -0.644** -0.674** -0.653** -0.579**
[0.165] [0.166] [0.172] [0.162] [0.165] [0.250] [0.259] [0.261] [0.287] [0.245]
IMPEN -0.544* -0.502*
[0.282] [0.262]
ln  LABPROD 0.200 0.218 0.211 0.240* 0.258* 0.322** 0.340** 0.332** 0.350*** 0.359***
[0.146] [0.153] [0.152] [0.130] [0.134] [0.136] [0.144] [0.143] [0.124] [0.128]
ln  Y 0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.016 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013
[0.042] [0.045] [0.043] [0.040] [0.042] [0.046] [0.047] [0.045] [0.042] [0.045]
CAPINT -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
SKINT 0.700* 0.759* 0.712* 0.527 0.732* 0.371 0.398 0.353 0.201 0.414
[0.408] [0.418] [0.421] [0.427] [0.373] [0.401] [0.414] [0.412] [0.415] [0.371]
ICT -1.051 -1.167 -1.313 -0.868 -1.352 -1.225 -1.319 -1.454 -0.978 -1.424
[2.006] [2.006] [1.946] [1.788] [1.842] [1.986] [1.986] [1.926] [1.763] [1.809]
FEMALE -0.219*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.219*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.181*** -0.181***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
MARRIED 0.055** 0.056** 0.052** 0.045* 0.045* 0.055** 0.056** 0.052** 0.045* 0.045*
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023]
FORBORN -0.101** -0.102** -0.105** -0.086* -0.086* -0.101** -0.102** -0.105** -0.086* -0.086*
[0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.045] [0.045] [0.050] [0.051] [0.051] [0.045] [0.045]
WHITE 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.108*** 0.108***
[0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.033] [0.033] [0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.032] [0.032]
METRO 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.099*** 0.099***
[0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025]
AGE 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.027***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
AGE2 / 100 -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.034*** -0.034***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
HIGHSKILLED 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.261*** 0.224*** 0.223*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.261*** 0.225*** 0.224***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.031] [0.029] [0.030] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.030] [0.030]
ln  CURRENT JOB HOURS 0.964*** 0.964*** 0.956*** 0.937*** 0.937*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.956*** 0.937*** 0.937***
[0.067] [0.067] [0.066] [0.066] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067] [0.065] [0.066] [0.066]
URATE -0.788 -0.761 -0.689 -0.429 -0.467 -0.737 -0.730 -0.643 -0.374 -0.421
[1.752] [1.765] [1.785] [1.680] [1.690] [1.728] [1.739] [1.762] [1.651] [1.661]
EXPERIENCE 0.088** 0.095** 0.096** 0.091** 0.098** 0.099**
[0.041] [0.042] [0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042]
# JOBS -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.047***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
ln  LOST JOB WAGE 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.177***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016]
LOST JOB TENURE 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
LOST JOB TENURE2 / 100 -0.047** -0.046** -0.047*** -0.046**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Industry- and State-Specific Time Trends NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
Obs. 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55
IV Statistics and Exogeneity Tests for Offshoring (separate regressions)
F -statistic 15.29 14.48 14.89 14.74 14.60 28.90 29.40 29.43 29.61 28.02
Hansen J -statistic 0.49 0.48 0.34 1.19 0.91 0.27 0.19 0.13 0.04 0.31
Hansen J -statistic (p -value) 0.48 0.49 0.56 0.28 0.34 0.61 0.66 0.72 0.85 0.58
C -statistic 1.67 1.84 1.19 1.51 1.99 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.49 0.29
C -statistic (p -value) 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.16 0.96 0.89 0.99 0.48 0.59
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by industry of displacement in brackets. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. All specifications
include full sets of dummies for predisplacement industry and occupation, state of residence, year of displacement and year of the survey. Variable names, definitions and
sources are reported in Table 1.
OS OS_Sc
Table 4 - Main Results
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Weekly Reemployment Wage
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Offshoring Proxy OS OS_Sc
Coefficient (1) (2)
OFFSHORING -0.415 -0.885**
[0.347] [0.443]
Obs. 2743 2743
R-squared 0.55 0.55
OFFSHORING -0.387** -0.748**
[0.188] [0.352]
Obs. 1886 1886
R-squared 0.54 0.54
OFFSHORING -1.633** -1.073**
[0.651] [0.498]
Obs. 1198 1198
R-squared 0.59 0.59
OFFSHORING -0.266* -0.463**
[0.162] [0.230]
MILLS RATIO -0.100 -0.107
[0.069] [0.068]
Obs. 2713 2713
R-squared 0.55 0.55
Table 5 - Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Weekly Reemployment Wage
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by industry of displacement in brackets. ***,**,*= significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level
respectively. In panel a), offshoring is normalized by industry output, in panel b) the sample is restricted to workers displaced no more than
two years before the interview, in panel c) only workers displaced by plant closing are included. The Mills Ratio reported in panel d) is
obtained from separate probit reemployment equations, shown in Table 6. All specifications except panel d) include the same control
variables as in columns (5) and (10) of Table 4; panel d) excludes the year-of-displacement dummies.
a) Normalizing Offshoring by Industry Output
d) Heckman Selectivity-Adjusted Estimates
b) Accounting for Recall Bias
c) Accounting for Endogeneity of Displacement 
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Offshoring Proxy OS OS_Sc
Coefficient (1) (2)
OFFSHORING -0.272 -2.577**
[0.463] [1.024]
IMPEN 0.162 0.341
[0.862] [0.863]
ln  LABPROD 0.767* 1.111**
[0.438] [0.459]
ln  Y -0.313** -0.340**
[0.137] [0.137]
CAPINT 0.000 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
SKINT -0.963 -1.987
[1.514] [1.567]
ICT 5.125 5.114
[5.045] [5.000]
FEMALE 0.018 0.017
[0.069] [0.069]
MARRIED 0.208*** 0.211***
[0.064] [0.064]
FORBORN 0.236** 0.240**
[0.102] [0.102]
WHITE 0.335*** 0.334***
[0.086] [0.086]
METRO 0.134 0.135
[0.086] [0.086]
AGE 0.002 0.002
[0.021] [0.021]
AGE2 / 100 -0.011 -0.011
[0.025] [0.025]
HIGHSKILLED 0.214** 0.209**
[0.090] [0.090]
EXPERIENCE 1.146*** 1.152***
[0.096] [0.097]
# JOBS 0.819*** 0.820***
[0.095] [0.095]
ln  LOST JOB WAGE 0.065 0.064
[0.043] [0.043]
LOST JOB TENURE 0.021* 0.022*
[0.013] [0.013]
LOST JOB TENURE2 / 100 -0.071* -0.072*
[0.043] [0.043]
REASON 2 0.018 0.016
[0.070] [0.070]
REASON 3 0.038 0.038
[0.087] [0.087]
NOTICE 0.138** 0.141**
[0.063] [0.063]
URATE -10.278** -9.679**
[4.663] [4.673]
Industry- and State-Specific Time Trends YES YES
Obs. 3491 3491
Pseudo R-squared 0.39 0.39
Log-likelihood -1177.02 -1174.57
Probit regressions with robust standard errors in brackets. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent level respectively. All specifications include full sets of dummies for predisplacement
industry and occupation, state of residence, year of displacement and year of the survey. Variable
names, definitions and sources are reported in Table 1.
Table 6 - Probit Reemployment Equation
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Reemployed Workers
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Offshoring Proxy
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OFFSHORING -0.272* -0.324* -0.335* -0.594*** -0.631*** -0.652** -0.556** -0.677**
[0.160] [0.181] [0.175] [0.193] [0.217] [0.247] [0.250] [0.286]
OFFSHORING*HIGHSKILLED -0.088 0.148
[0.215] [0.202]
OFFSHORING*WHITECOLLAR 0.068 0.133
[0.178] [0.099]
OFFSHORING*FEMALE 0.108 -0.099
[0.163] [0.106]
OFFSHORING*WHITE 0.369 0.139
[0.229] [0.167]
Obs. 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743 2743
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
OS OS_Sc
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by industry of displacement in brackets. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. All
specifications include the same control variables as in columns (5) and (10) of Table 4. WHITECOLLAR is a dummy equal to 1 if before displacement the worker
performed one of the following occupations: executive, administrative and managerial occupations; professional specialty occupations; technical and related
support occupations; sales occupations; administrative support occupations; other service occupations. 
Table 7 - Worker Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Weekly Reemployment Wage
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Offshoring Proxy
Coefficient (1) (2) (3) (4)
OFFSHORING -0.042 0.334** 0.128 0.225
[0.210] [0.159] [0.144] [0.288]
OFFSHORING*NEWSECTOR -0.625*** -0.671***
[0.159] [0.137]
OFFSHORING*NEWINDUSTRY -0.766*** -0.785***
[0.158] [0.262]
Obs. 2743 2743 2743 2743
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
OS OS_Sc
OLS regressions with standard errors clustered by industry of displacement in brackets. ***,**,* = significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent
level respectively. All specifications include the same control variables as in columns (5) and (10) of Table 4. NEWSECTOR is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual is reemployed outside the manufacturing sector. NEWINDUSTRY is a dummy equal to 1 if the
individual is reemployed in a different 3-digit manufacturing industry.
Table 8 - Sectorial and Industrial Mobility after Displacement
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Weekly Reemployment Wage
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